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INTRODUCTION
In the Final Order1 being appealed by NMA, the district court refused to engage in
a substantial evidence analysis consistent with the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in
McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 65, 423 P.3d 1284. Instead, the Final Order states:
While the law of the case doctrine may not strictly apply to this situation, the
Court nonetheless may, as it has considered and decided these matters on
effectively the same record in NMA I once before, determine that it need not
reconsider them and instead rely on its prior determination that, but for the
due process violation, the county commission’s decision was not illegal and
was supported by substantial evidence.
(See Record Submitted on April 16, 2018 (the “Original Record”), R2877A2).
Having determined that “it appears that the record from NMA I was considered by
the district court in reaching the decision now on appeal,” this Court permitted
supplementation of the Original Record to include “all papers filed and appearing on the
docket in Northern Monticello Alliance LLC v. San Juan County, case no 16070001, Utah
Seventh District Court, referred to as NMA I.” See Order dated August 14, 2018 (the
“Order”). The Court further ruled that “NMA is entitled to file a supplement to its brief,
if it chooses to do so, addressing materials in the record following supplementation.”
The record from NMA I (the “Supplemental Record”) was submitted on August
22, 2018.3 Pursuant to the Order, NMA now submits this supplement to the Brief of
Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC to address materials in the Supplemental Record.
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Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms have the meanings ascribed to them
in the Brief of Northern Monticello Alliance, LLC dated June 28, 2018.
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Citations to the Original Record are noted with an “A” following the page number.

3

Citations to the Supplemental Record are noted with a “B” following the page number.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
The Planning Commission, not the County Commission, is the body vested with
authority to receive evidence and make findings of fact that are relevant to the legal
standards governing its decision. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27a-707(3). Cf. McElhaney,
107 UT 65, ¶ 40 (it is the land use authority’s responsibility to define the basis for its
decision, not the appeal authority’s).
As demonstrated by the Supplemental Record, the Planning Commission never
produced explicit written findings of fact or conclusions of law to provide a substantial
evidentiary basis for its determination that sPower was in compliance with the Amended
CUP. The only contemporaneous written record regarding the Planning Commission’s
decision not to revoke the Amended CUP comprises the minutes of its September 9 and
September 14, 2015 revocation hearings, which state only that:
Studies were done relating to sound, flicker, and light. Thresholds were
determined and affected lands were indicated. Mitigation for lands affected
were determined and compensation amounts decided.
September 9, 2015 Minutes (R000049B).
The other issue was whether or not any mitigation for sound, light, and flicker
had taken place. This is a more subjective issue and not black and white. It
was determined that mitigation had taken place as much as possible at this
time.
September 14, 2015 Minutes (R000051B).
The Planning Commission did not specifically identify any actual “studies” it
received from sPower prior to its decision on September 14, 2015, nor did it explain how
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the “studies” demonstrated that sPower had mitigated adverse impacts on the NMA
Property or whether any mitigation compensation had been made to NMA Members.4
In its subsequent appeal to the County Commission dated November 5, 2015, NMA
argued that it never had the opportunity to present compelling evidence of sPower’s failure
to comply with the conditions of the Amended CUP before the Planning Commission and
provided its evidence to the County Commission. (R002175B – R002370B).
sPower, through its counsel, Snell & Wilmer, submitted a letter dated November 5,
2015, with attachments, to the County Commission on appeal. (R001722B – R002174B).
Included in sPower’s submission was a September 23, 2015 letter from sPower’s counsel,
Sean McBride, to the Planning Commission, with enclosures purportedly outlining
sPower’s mitigation efforts. (R002151B).
The Planning Commission also submitted a Written Brief dated November 5, 2015.
(R002642B – R002655B). With respect to the mitigation evidence before it at the
September 9 and September 15, 2014 hearings, the Planning Commission stated only that:
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sPower conceded that there is a financial mitigation condition of the Amended CUP, but
claims to have fulfilled that condition:
To the extent that light, flicker and sound could not be fully mitigated,
evidence on the record demonstrates that sPower satisfied “financial
mitigation” commitments and provided monetary compensation to
neighboring properties as required under the CUP.

Sustainable Power Group, LLC and Latigo Wind Park, LLC’s Memorandum Opposing
Northern Monticello Alliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R002944B).
3

[A]t the September 9, 2015 Planning Commission meeting, the PC received
information and evidence concerning the Permittees [sic] efforts to mitigate
the harm of its project on others. In the Permittee’s presentation, the PC
received studies concerning sound, flicker, and light. It received information
on thresholds and how they were determined and what neighboring lands
were affected.
(R002645B).
Again, the Planning Commission failed to identify the “information” and “studies”
or to provide the “presentation” upon which it purportedly relied to determine that sPower
had fulfilled the mitigation requirements of the Amended CUP. There is no indication in
the record that the Planning Commission ever transmitted to the County Commission any
of the actual evidence it considered or any contemporaneous record of its proceedings,
aside from its September 9, 2015 and September 14, 2015 Minutes.
After a hearing on NMA’s appeal on November 10, 2015, the County Commission
issued its Final Written Decision dated December 2, 2015, wherein it found that:
We have been presented with no evidence in this appeal that s*Power has
worked to mitigate sound, light, and flicker other than s*Power’s
representation that it has done studies and mitigated effects that exceeded
the thresholds it set. … That is insufficient for us to determine whether
s*Power is meeting the Latigo CUP’s mitigation condition, and we therefore
believe it was also insufficient for the [Planning] Commission to conclude
that s*Power was satisfying the condition.
(R000094B – R000095B) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the County Commission reversed the P&Z Decision and remanded the
matter back to the Planning Commission to allow NMA to be heard (R000095B –
R000096B), which is what NMA has been seeking all along.
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Threatening a $100 million damages claim, on December 3, 2015, sPower
demanded that the County Commission reverse the Final Written Decision, asserting that
it had provided mitigation evidence other than its own self-serving representations to the
Planning Commission. On December 8, 2015, the County Commission issued its Amended
Decision, upholding the Planning Commission’s decision in its entirety and denying NMA
a hearing before the Planning Commission, stating that: “sPower is correct that, for reasons
we need not go into, we had not considered the mitigation evidence it had presented to the
Planning Commission at the time we rendered our December 2 ‘Written Decision.’”
(Amended Decision, R000018B). This “mitigation evidence” comprised “two three-ring
binders of information” sPower claimed to have given to the Planning Commission at or
prior to the September 9 or September 14, 2015 revocation hearings. (Id.).
While acknowledging that the Planning Commission had failed to make any
findings of fact to support its decision not to revoke the Amended CUP, the County
Commission attempted to discern the evidentiary basis for the Planning Commission’s
decision from the materials supplied to the County Commission by sPower in its post hoc
September 23, 2015 letter. (R000018B – R000019B). The County Commission then upheld
the P&Z Decision based on its own conclusions – a result eschewed by McElhaney – rather
than remanding the matter to the Planning Commission to generate explicit findings See
2017 UT 65, ¶¶ 39-40. The County Commission further concluded, without evidentiary
support, that the existence of the Purchase Option was sufficient evidence of financial
mitigation to NMA to uphold the Planning Commission’s determination that sPower had
met the financial mitigation condition of the Amended CUP. (R000020B).
5

As noted by Commissioner Phil Lyman in his dissenting opinion, the “mitigation
evidence” received by the County Commission was sPower’s November 5, 2015 letter,
with the attached September 23, 2015 letter. (See Lyman Dissent, R000847B).
Commissioner Lyman recognized there is “no evidence” that the materials contained in the
September 23, 2015 letter were in fact “considered by the Planning Commission at their
September 9 or 14, 2015 meetings,” although the Planning Commission “may have had
similar information.” (See Lyman Dissent, R000847B). Commissioner Lyman then noted
that “[t]he issues of sound, flicker, light, are technical questions that deserve at least some
evidence of effort on the part of the planning and zoning commission to assess. No such
evidence was presented to the hearing authority.” (R000848B) (emphasis added).
Commissioner Lyman further stated that there was no evidence that sPower had
fulfilled the financial mitigation requirements of the Amended CUP, but rather that the
evidence showed that sPower “did not mitigate in relation to the NMA Land Owners.” He
further characterized sPower’s assertion that it had in fact paid NMA Members “full value
for their properties under the mitigation agreement” as “absurd.” (R000848B – R000849B).
Commissioner Lyman concluded:
[The Amended] CUP states that proof of financial mitigation payments be
verified before a building permit is issued. No one is asserting that the
specifics of the financial transaction between Latigo and NMA are the
county’s business, but what we have here is clear evidence that Latigo Wind
Park’s assertion, that it provided mitigation through compensation to NMA
land owners, is completely false.
(R000850B) (emphasis added).
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NMA timely appealed the Amended Decision to the district court arguing, among
other things, that the Amended Decision was arbitrary and capricious in that it was not
supported by substantial evidence. (See Amended Complaint and Petition for Judicial
Review dated February 10, 2016, R000127B – R000128B). After briefing and a hearing
on competing motions for summary judgment and a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the district court issued its Memorandum of Decision on the August 30, 2016 Hearing dated
September 9, 2016 (“Memorandum Decision”). (R003158B).
In the Memorandum Decision, the district court found that, where the County based
the Amended Decision on an ex parte communication, the reconsideration “did not
originate from the evidence,” and NMA received neither notice of sPower’s September 23,
2015 letter nor an opportunity to be heard in opposition, the Amended Decision violated
NMA’s due process rights and was therefore illegal. (R003164B – R003165B).
The district court’s entire “substantial evidence” analysis in the Memorandum
Decision was as follows:
A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is not supported by substantial
evidence. The County’s decision to reverse its earlier order was based on its
failure to consider “two three ring binders of information” on SPower’s
mitigation efforts. In these binders, the County found sound, light, and
flicker studies that it relied on to conclude that SPower’s mitigation efforts
met the requirements of the permit. Accordingly, the court cannot find that
the County’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence.
(R003163B).
It is this “prior determination” upon which the district court relied when it refused
to apply the stringent analytical requirements of McElhaney in the instant matter. (See
Final Order, R2877A). There is no indication in the district court’s analysis what
7

information was in the “two three ring binders” or whether the information in the binders
was considered by the Planning Commission. In fact, it is impossible to tell whether the
district court even looked at the “three ring binders” in determining whether the Planning
Commission’s revocation decision or the County Commission’s Amended Decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, it was impossible for the district court to
conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the Planning Commission’s
revocation decision, as the County Commission concluded in its Amended Decision.5
Nevertheless, the district court relied on this “prior determination,” stating at the
hearing on the summary judgment at issue on this appeal:
THE COURT: Okay. All right, well, I’m not sure whether law of the case,
the appellate--well it actually can be trial court doctrine, but also an appellate
court doctrine--I’m not sure how it applies in this circumstance. It may not
strictly apply, but I have the right to say, I’ve considered this once, I don’t
want to consider it again.
And so at the very least, that’s what I’m doing here. I’m not going to go back
into the question of whether there’s substantial evidence … .
Transcript of August 29, 2017 Hearing (R2825A – R2825A).

5

The district court directed NMA’s counsel to prepare a judgment on the Memorandum
Decision. NMA prepared a proposed judgment vacating the Amended Decision,
reinstating the Written Decision and remanding the matter back to the Planning
Commission. (R003188B – R003190B). Responding to the County’s objection to the
proposed judgment remanding the matter to the Planning Commission, NMA explained
why remand to the Planning Commission was imperative. (R003181B – R003186B). The
district court rejected NMA’s proposed order and entered a Judgment remanding the
matter back to the County Commission, which had no authority to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law. (R003215B). The Judgment was subsequently amended to
remove any indication that NMA’s counsel prepared the Judgment or approved the
Judgment as to form. (R003243B – R003244B).
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While the district court relied on the prior record in making its decision, it made no
effort to apply the principles of McElhaney to that prior record. Such an analysis would
mandate remand of this matter to the Planning Commission to generate explicit findings of
fact and conclusions of law to permit meaningful appellate review. See McElhaney, 2017
UT 65, ¶¶ 40-41.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2018.
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

/s/ Jennie B. Garner
J. Craig Smith
Jennie B. Garner
Attorneys for Appellant
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Barton H. Kunz II
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405 South Main Street, Ste. 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Elizabeth M. Brereton
SNELL & WILMER LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801. 257. 1900
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lbrereton@swlaw.com
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/s/ Jennie B. Garner
J. Craig Smith
Jennie B. Garner
Attorneys for Appellant
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